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1. Introduction
The practice of making payments of questionable legality and propriety by
American corporations engaged in international business transactions is now a
well-known fact. Since 1974 [1], over four hundred companies have admitted
making questionable or illegal payments abroad involving hundreds of millions
of dollars [2]. According to a U.S. Senate report, the revelation of these payoffs
has had "severe adverse effects" on U.S. foreign policy and business:
Foreign governments friendly to the United States in Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands have come
under intense pressure from their own people. The image of American democracy abroad has been
tarnished. Confidence in the financial integrity of our corporations has been impaired. The
efficient functioning of our capital markets has been hampered [3].
The gravity of the international payments problem in the mid-1970s
prompted the United States Congress and several foreign governments to
conduct independent re-examinations of existing anti-bribery laws and en-
forcement policies. By 1976, this re-examination in the United States had cast
considerable doubt upon the efficiency of both domestic and foreign laws
designed to deter corrupt behavior. Elliot Richardson, then Chairman of the
President's Task Force on Corporate Payments Abroad, concluded that U.S.
law, even when vigorously enforced, was inadequate to deal with the payments
problem [4]. U.S. officials also believed that vague and imprecise foreign laws
did not provide effective guidelines for U.S. corporations operating abroad.
Testifying before a Senate hearing on prohibiting foreign bribes, SEC Chair-
man Roderick Hills stated:
I do not think that we have the capacity to decide what is or is not legal under foreign laws. I hate
to say how many file cabinets of my former law firm were filled with opinions expressing no
opinion as to whether a given transaction was legal or illegal .... We are concerned that companies
that make an illegal action know they are acting at their peril [5).
• This article is dated as of January 10, 1981.
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In response to concerns such as those expressed by Secretary Richardson
and Chairman Hills, many nations, including the United States, have con-
fronted the problem of questionable international business payments by enact-
ing legislation designed to provide clearer guidelines for corporate behavior.
These laws have taken two forms: (1) legislation prescribing criminal liability
for those involved in a bribery scheme ("bribery laws") and (2) other laws and
regulations which, although not directly prohibiting bribery, are designed to
create an environment in which bribery cannot flourish. The latter category has
typically included regulations which call for full disclosure of business activi-
ties and payments (e.g. securities laws), laws limiting the individuals and
entities with whom one may have business dealings (e.g. commercial agents
laws, civil servants regulations), and laws regulating the circumstances under
*which government contracts are awarded (e.g. tender regulations).
The most recent response of the American government to the bribery
problem utilizes both of the above approaches. The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA) [6] was enacted making it unlawful for "reporting companies and
domestic concerns" directly or indirectly to bribe foreign government officials,
foreign political parties and their officials, and candidates for foreign office [7].
In addition, the FCPA requires that accurate books and records be maintained
and that a system of internal accounting controls be established by companies
subject to the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
[8].
In foreign jurisdictions bribery historically has been subject to criminal
prosecution under domestic penal codes [9]. The major response of foreign
governments to the payments problem has been the promise of more effective
enforcement of existing bribery laws. In recent years, however, the difficulty of
enforcing criminal laws in a transnational context has become increasingly
apparent. Consequently, many foreign governments have also endeavored to
prevent bribery by prophylactic means.
This article discusses the potential effect of domestic and foreign law on
American companies doing business in the Middle East. The Middle East has
been chosen as a focal point because the practice of questionable payments by
foreign corporations is thought to be particularly pervasive in that part of the
world [10]. At one time or another, most American companies operating in the
area are faced with the prospect of making payments which could result in
criminal liability or other disciplinary action under the growing body of U.S.
or Middle Eastern anti-bribery laws [11]. This article examines the relevant
laws of seventeen Middle Eastern jurisdictions and the United States Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act within the context of a number of business transactions
which are common in the Middle East. Those jurisdictions examined are
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,
Syria, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Yemen Arab Republic, Kuwait, Iraq, pre-rev-
olutionary Iran [12] and Turkey. Generally speaking, these anti-bribery laws
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focus upon two types of payoffs: (I) payments made directly to public
officials, and (2) payments made to a private individual where the payor has a
reason to know that the payment may be passed on by that individual to a
public official.
Notwithstanding the post-Watergate efforts to provide clearer guidelines for
corporate behavior, ascertaining the legality of business payments under Mid-
dle Eastern law or the FCPA continues to be a troublesome matter for
American businessmen and lawyers. Generally speaking, these laws are fraught
with vaguely drafted provisions, the parameters of which have yet to be
defined in the courts [13]. In a few cases the statutory ambiguities may be
clarified by an examination of legislative history, interpretative or implement-
ing regulations, and enforcement trends within each jurisdiction. More often
than not, however, a businessman is left with little more than bare statutory
language as a guide. Recognizing the need for further guidance, some Middle
Eastern governments have made it possible to obtain a clearer definition of
statutory language from the government ministry involved. In the United
States the Department of Justice has issued regulations creating the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure whereby companies covered under
the Act can receive a statement as to whether a proposed transaction would
violate the FCPA anti-bribery provisions or whether the department would
bring any enforcement action [14]. For various reasons, however, recourse to
such procedures has proved an unpopular alternative, and companies continue
to rely on their own case-by-case interpretations of these laws despite the
ambiguities and potential liabilities involved.
In addition to the difficulties encountered in ascertaining the scope and
intent of the laws treated here, there remains the question of whether the
applicable statute will be enforced. Even in instances in which Middle Eastern
law appears unambiguous, the existence of erratic enforcement precedent
within a given jurisdiction is not uncommon. Although the FCPA was enacted
with a view toward compensating for this inability or unwillingness of foreign
governments to enforce their anti-bribery laws, many of the jurisdictional and
policy based obstacles must be overcome by those responsible for enforcing the
Act.
Given these uncertainties accompanying business transactions in the Middle
East, it is not surprising that American businessmen continue to view Middle
Eastern law and the FCPA as sources of confusion rather than guidance. This
article attempts to alleviate some of this confusion by clarifying the legal issues
raised by various types of business payments in the Middle East.
In an effort to provide guidance in these matters, Appendices I to IV offer
affirmative or negative answers to relevant questions regarding the permissibil-
ity of payments in each of the eighteen jurisdictions examined here. Where
possible, the resolution of issues is achieved by reference to judicial decision,
enforcement trends and interpretive regulations issued by local authorities.
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However, even in cases where government guidance has been noted, the reader
should be aware that interpretations of administering authorities in the Middle
East often change quickly and may not be universal in their application. In
those instances where statutory language alone serves as a guide, the author is
content simply to make the laws known and point out any ambiguities
contained therein. The information provided in these pages, therefore, is
offered not as a definitive checklist of the jurisdictions where certain types of
payments are legal. Rather, the appendices and discussion below are intended
to serve as a broad overview and comparative assessment of current Middle
Eastern bribery law from which an informed businessman can ascertain the
legal issues and sources of law relevant to a given transaction.
2. Bribery statutes: Scope and content
Bribery of public officials is expressly prohibited by statute in each of the
seventeen Middle Eastern nations. Although the definition of the illicit conduct
varies considerably in scope and content from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the
statutes are consistent with respect to the nature of their general proof
requirements. Under each nation's bribery laws the legality of a given payment
will depend upon (1) the legal status of the recipient of the payment [151, (2)
the type of consideration [16], and (3) the motive of the payor [17]. Thus, the
following issues are raised by each of the bribery laws examined in this article:
1. Which persons are prohibited from receiving a payment?
(a) Public officials? Is the term public official defined or is it a vague
category?
(b) Intermediaries, agents or middlemen?
(c) Must the action requested of the official be within the scope of his
official duties?
2. Which types of consideration are prohibited?
(a) Specifically mentioned methods only (e.g. money payments, property,
services, political contributions)?
(b) "Any benefit" granted to the recipient? If so, is the statute explicit as to
what constitutes a benefit?
(c) Can the payments legally be made for the benefit of a related third
party (e.g. the recipient's spouse, children, friends or "favorite charity")?
3. Does the purpose of the payor render the payment unlawful?




In addition to these factual determinations, the penalties to which the payor
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may be subject are also examined. Appendices I to IV contain answers to the
above questions with respect to each jurisdiction examined.
2.1. Which persons are prohibited from receiving payments?
2.1.1. Public officials
Virtually every Middle Eastern country has anti-bribery laws [18] prohibit-
ing "public officials" from receiving benefits (other than those that the official
has a legal right to receive) for the performance or non-performance of their
official duties. Beyond this general rule, however, certain definitional problems
arise: Who is a "public official"? Can the law be avoided by simply using an
intermediary to transmit a payment? Must the act requested fall within the
scope of the recipient's official duties? In many cases the legality of a given
payment will turn on the answers to these questions.
In at least six of the nations examined, the term "public official" is left
undefined by the bribery statutes [19]. For instance, chapter 13 of the Criminal
Code of Sudan (entitled "Crimes Committed by Public Officials or Concerning
Them: The Public Official Who Collects a Gift for his Public Duty") states
only that: "Anyone who is a public official or expects to be one and accepts or
takes for himself or another (a bribe) ... shall be punished ... " [20]. Un-
doubtedly, the term public official includes high level government officials, and
in the case of Sudan, anyone who expects to be elected or appointed to such a
position. A broader reading of the law, however, would forbid any payments to
low-level government employees in clerical positions, employees of govern-
ment-owned corporations, political organizations and candidates, agents, and
other representatives of the government. Were the issue to be litigated in a
jurisdiction such as Sudan, it is unclear whether such a broad interpretation
would prevail. In those Middle Eastern nations where the term "public
official" has been defined [21], the definition invariably encompasses all
individuals entrusted with a public service. The Egyptian code, for instance,
defines "public officials" as
(I) all employees of the agencies dependent on the state or placed under its jurisdiction: (2) all
elected, or appointed members of the general and local representative councils: (3) arbiters.
experts, syndics. liquidators. and judicial trustees: (4) every individual entrusted with a public
service [221.
In contrast to the Sudanese code, the Egyptian provision leaves less room for
doubt in the mind of the potential payor as to the questionable nature of his
contemplated payment.
A more difficult question, raised at the opposite end of the "public official"
spectrum, concerns the status of royal family members under local bribery
laws. Although the term "public official" is defined in the bribery statutes of
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four of the six monarchies treated here [23], none of these definitions explicitly
refers to royal family members. While it is clear that a prince who holds a
governmental position is a "public official", those royal family members who
do not perform governmental functions arguably are not "public officials".
Thus, under this argument, payments to such persons would not be prohibited
by anti-bribery laws. The issue is most likely to arise where a royal family
member (who is otherwise not connected with the government) solicits or
requests payments in return for his real or alleged personal influence with his
relatives in government. Theoretically, a foreign company bidding on a govern-
ment contract has contact only with the government agency approving the
contract. In fact, however, it is not uncommon for members of royal families
not associated with a government ministry to intervene in the bidding process.
Although such an arrangement is apparently not prohibited by bribery laws, it
should be noted that royal family member as well as the paying companies
may be punished under other local laws. Most Middle Eastern nations have
regulations that prohibit such "influence peddling" and provide that the payor,
the intermediary and the recipient may be criminally liable even where no
payment is ever made or offered to a "public official" [24].
The FCPA prohibits the awarding of payments or gifts to foreign officials,
foreign political parties or candidates and any intermediary between the
paying American business and any "foreign official" [25]. A "foreign official"
is defined in the Act as "any officer or employee of a foreign government or
any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an
official capacity for or on behalf of such government or department, agency or
instrumentality" [26]. As in the Middle East, it appears likely that domestic
courts will interpret the term broadly. The phrase "acting on behalf of" is
taken from the U.S. domestic bribery statute [27] in which context it has been
given a broad construction; for example, it has been held to apply to a
municipal employee engaged in administering a federal program [28]. Although
the terms "agency" and "instrumentality" are likewise not defined in the
FCPA, they arguably include most state-run enterprises [29]. Such broad
definition of public officials would increase the significance of the Act in the
Middle East where industiies are owned by the state in many countries.
The FCPA specifically excludes from the class of forbidden recipients "any
employee of a foreign government or any department, agency or instrumental-
ity thereof whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical" [30]. The clear
intent of Congress was to exclude from the coverage of the Act payments
designed to persuade low level government officials to perform functions or
services that they are obliged to carry out as part of their governmental
responsibilities, but that they may refuse or delay unless compensated. In its
report, the House Committee concluded that while such "grease" payments
would be considered "reprehensible" in the U.S., they may be neither uncom-
mon nor undesirable in other nations [31]. It is important to note, however,
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that grease payments are almost always illegal under Middle Eastern law,
because of its generally broader definition of public official. Thus, when
contemplating making such payments, an American corporation should not
rely solely on the fact that it will not be engaging in activity that is prohibited
by the FCPA.
2.1.2. Agents and intermediaries
U.S. corporations abroad commonly make business payments to local
agents and intermediaries. In the Middle East the use of a local business agent
frequently makes good business sense [32]. Indeed, many Middle Eastern
nations require that foreign businesses employ a local agent when doing
business with the host government. Agents are well acquainted with Middle
Eastern business practice and often have considerable influence in government
through family or friendship ties. Not surprisingly, U.S. corporations have
been willing to pay large "commissions" and "fees" for the services of an
influential "agent" [33]. These practices, however, raise significant legal ques-
tions. Depending upon who the agent is and how he "influences" the host
government, such payments may be illegal.
A payment to a local agent will usually take one of three forms: (1)
payments to local agents who are also public officials; (2) payments to local
agents who are private businessmen; or (3) payments to local agents who are
private businessmen serving as conduits for payments to a public official. In
the first case, where the local agent is a public official, the question arises as to
whether local law permits public officials to act as commercial agents in
matters unrelated to their official duties. As noted above, most Middle Eastern
nations penalize any influence peddling by public officials and private individ-
uals. In this situation, however, the official ostensibly is not selling his
influence, but merely representing a foreign company in the host country by
acting as that company's agent. Generally speaking, local bribery statutes and
commercial agents regulations do not prohibit such "moonlighting" activities
on the part of public officials or royal family members. A notable exception is
Iraq where a public official who acts as an agent "for a fee or commission or
for any material benefit, shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment" [34].
Again, however, other local laws may come into play. Article 13 of the Saudi
Arabian Civil Service Regulations, for instance, provides that "government
employees" must refrain from:
(A) engaging directly or indirectly in commercial activities. (B) establishing or forming companies
or accepting to be a member on their Boards of Directors or accepting employment by such
companies or in a commercial activity unless ... appointed by the government to represent the
latter in the company. However, by special implementing regulations to be issued by the Council
of Ministers. government employees may be permitted to work and be employed in the private
sector outside government business hours [35].
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Notwithstanding provisions such as article 13, which greatly limit the com-
mercial activities of government employees, "moonlighting" remains an
accepted practice in Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern nations [36].
Public officials rarely "moonlight" as commercial agents however. Local
authorities apparently take the view that "moonlighting" is permissible where
it does not present a conflict of interest and does not involve the selling of
"influence" as it might in an agency context. In furtherance of this view, Saudi
Arabia's article 13 provides that government employees may receive special
permission from their ministries to work in the private sector [37].
The second and more common situation involves payments to an agent who
is a private businessman. As noted above, such payments are not considered
bribes but the lawful collection of "fees" which are paid in consideration for
services rendered in jurisdictions where the use of agents is not prohibited. In
the third situation, however, the commercial agent acts as a "conduit" for
payments which will eventually settle in the hands of a public official. Here the
agent typically transfers part of his commission to the government official who
awards the contract. As a practical matter, local enforcement authorities may
be unable to determine when an agent has passed on to a public official part of
what would otherwise be a legal payment for services rendered by the agent.
Thus, by using a private businessman as a go-between the foreign corporation
insulates itself from having to deal directly with the official and disguises its
bribe in the form of agents "fees" or "commissions". In recognition of this
tactic, most Middle Eastern nations have provisions in their bribery laws
explicitly or implicitly prohibiting the use of intermediaries as "conduits" for
illegal payments [38]. However, because the second payment is not often
discussed by the agent and his principal (whether or not it is understood), a
corporation might try to circumvent Middle Eastern bribery laws by simply
not asking questions once the "legal" commission is paid to its agent. Most
Middle Eastern statutes do not explicitly impose a duty upon the principal to
inquire into the post-payment activities of its commercial agents. The question
whether a Middle Eastern statute would be read to reach a principal's
"constructive knowledge" has not arisen and the outcome would be difficult to
predict were the issue to be raised. -
The FCPA forbids payments by a U.S. corporation to its foreign agents if
the corporation, its officers or directors know or have "reason to know" that
the agent will offer all or part of the payment to a foreign official for any of
the corrupt purposes identified in the Act [391. Unfortunately, both the Act
and its legislative history provide little guidance on the question of whether a
U.S. company has "reason to know" that a proposed business relationship
contravenes the Act. Using the securities laws as an analogy, two constructions
of the phrase are plausible. The first would require an affirmative refusal to act
on known facts suggesting that a payment will in fact be made [40]. An
alternative standard, applied in the context of criminal prosecutions under the
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securities laws, would impose the FCPA's criminal sanctions for a negligent
failure to exercise due diligence to uncover material facts [41]. The "reason to
know" language, however, must be read in conjunction with the FCPA's
requirement that the company have acted "corruptly" [42]. Because that
language seems to impose a specific intent requirement independent of any
notion of "reason to know", it is therefore arguable that a conviction under the
bribery provisions of the Act could not be based solely on the negligent failure
of a corporation to uncover facts suggesting that its payments to a local agent
may be channeled to a foreign official.
In any event, a finding that a U.S. company has failed to exercise due
diligence may serve as an indication to the SEC that proper internal account-
ing controls have not been implemented. Thus, even where a company success-
fully avoids liability under the anti-bribery provisions of the Act, it may find
that it has backed into a section 102 accounting violation if it is a reporting
company [43].
The kinds of facts which the paying company would have a duty to
ascertain under the second standard, or, alternatively, would be forbidden
from disregarding under the first standard, are suggested in a pre-FCPA SEC
report to the Proxmire Committee [44]. These include the size and nature of the
payment, the services to be performed by the agent, the method and manner of
payment, and the relationship of the agent to the governmental entity or
contracting party.
The size of commission payments or consultant's fees provides a useful
illustration of the two standards discussed above. Thus, fees that are substan-
tially in excess of the going rate for particular services may suggest that a
portion of the fee is being passed on to foreign officials. Under the first
reading of "reason to know", requiring actual knowledge of corrupt practices,
an awareness of "large" fees seldom would give rise to a violation of the
FCPA. Under the second reading, however, an offense might be predicated on
a negligent failure to pursue such facts.
A. recent development might provide some guidance for companies even
under the second reading of "reason to know". A few Middle Eastern nations
have placed ceilings on the commissions payable to local agents involved in
certain government contracts. These ceilings, of course, indicate the market
rate for particular services. Arguably, payments within the limits prescribed by
foreign law would not be suggestive of bribes being passed on to foreign
officials. Enforcement authorities, however, may take the view that the size of
payments may be a very small percentage of a transaction and yet an
extremely large absolute sum of money for an individual and thus a very
strong suggestion of improper influence. Nonetheless, it seems that if the
paying company can demonstrate that the payments are commensurate with
market sales for comparable projects, then even the second reading should not
give rise to a violation of the Act.
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In addition to their concern with the size of a payment, FCPA enforcement
authorities may take the view that payments designated as "finders fees" are
more suspect than those paid in consideration for conventional sales and
promotional services provided by agents in the normal course of selling a
product or service. The payment of "finders fees", however, is a legitimate and
accepted practice in most Middle Eastern jurisdictions. Indeed, in several
nations a foreign contractor must have a local agent in order to do business in
that jurisdiction. Presumably, if it can be shown that the "finders fee" is paid
in one of these jurisdictions at the "going rate" a company would not be
vulnerable to a charge that the paucity of services performed by its agent
makes the payments economically unjustifiable. In those countries that do not
permit local agents to act as intermediaries for the foreign company and the
contracting government ministry, but do allow the agent to provide valuable
technical and consulting advice to the foreign company, the economic justifica-
tion for the size of the commission payment should be made by reference to
what is customary in the area on comparable projects.
It is not unlikely that the SEC would also discourage American firms from
complying with requests by agents that their fees be paid in numbered but
otherwise unidentified bank accounts. Some observers have suggested that such
a request may constitute a "red flag" under U.S. law whereby a U.S. corpora-
tion would have a duty at least to inquire as to the reason behind such
accommodation requests [45]. Among the other precautionary measures that
practitioners and commentators have recommended is the inclusion of clauses
in the agency contract whereby the agent agrees not to contravene the FCPA
or local bribery laws [46]. It has alsb been suggested that pre-employment
screening procedures be undertaken whereby the "reputation" of the local
agent could be ascertained [47].
2.2. Actions beyond the scope of the recipient's official duties
At common law, when a questionable payment is linked with an act entirely
outside the official function of the public employee, it is held that bribery has
not been committed [48]. Although this rule is apparently followed in some
Middle East countries [49], most have incorporated into their bribery statutes
provisions broad enough to cover certain acts outside the scope of the
recipient's official duties. The Saudi Arabian regulations against bribery, for
instance, provide:
Any public official who solicits or accepts for himself or another a promise or gift in order to use
his genuine or alleged influence to try to get from any public authority, works, ordinances.
decisions, commitments, concessions, procurements contracts, or a job, service, or any kind of
privilege is guilty of bribery and shall be punished ... [50].
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Similarly, under the FCPA it is unlawful for an American corporation to
give anything to a foreign official for the purposes of:
(A) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity including a
decision to fail to perform his official functions: or (B) inducing such foreign official to use his
influence with a foreign government or instrumentality 151].
Thus, the combined effect of the FCPA and Middle Eastern bribery statutes is
to prohibit American corporations from rewarding a foreign official for many
actions only tenuously related with his governmental functions.
2.3. Which types of consideration are prohibited?
The methods resorted to by corporations making international payoffs are
numerous and can be complex. The following list, compiled by one author,
names the principal types of payments:
(a) Cash.
(b) Deposits in numbered foreign bank accounts.
(c) Overbilling of sales with kickback to the buyer.
(d) Gifts of property (watches, jewelry, paintings, "free" samples).
(e) Gifts of service (use of automobiles, aircraft, hunting lodges, payments
of rent on homes, country club dues, etc.).
(f) Payment of travel and entertainment expenses.
(g) Making unsecured loans - never collected.
(h) Putting relatives on the payroll as "consultants".
(i) Providing scholarships and educational expenses for children.
(j) Making contributions to charities of the payee's choice.
(k) Purchasing property from the payee at an inflated price.
(1) Selling property to payee at a deflated price [52].
In most Middle Eastern states a public official is prohibited from receiving
"any benefit" (other than his salary, etc.) for the performance or non-
performance of his duties [53]. In these jurisdictions the term "any benefit"
could be broadly construed to cover any of the payments listed above. A few
bribery statutes such as Sudan's specify certain common modes of bribery that
fall under the rubric of a "benefit" [54]. In certain jurisdictions, however, it is
arguable that the form of payment alone may exempt otherwise guilty parties
from liability under local bribery laws. In pre-revolutionary Iran, for instance,
only the acceptance of goods or money was explicitly prohibited, thus opening
up a whole range of payments in "services" which would have been out of the
range of the Iranian anti-bribery law [55].
A related question concerns payments or gifts not directly benefiting the
public official. Such payments are commonly made to or for the benefit of the
official's spouse, children or a related third party. In most middle Eastern
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
P.J. Suse / Questionable paqrnenis in dhe Middle East
states these awards are arguably bribes under language that forbids the official
from requesting or accepting a benefit either "for himself or another" in return
for his performance of an act [56]. A literal reading of this language, however,
suggests that the public official has not acted illegally as long as he has not
actually requested or physically accepted a benefit on behalf of a third party.
For instance, has an official acted illegally when he awards a contract to a
company that has recently given his wife expensive diamond jewelry? In such a
factual setting, a court applying local bribery laws, in all likelihood, would
determine the legality of the gift by reference to its effect on the bidding
process. Where the bid is high and would not otherwise have been granted but
for the gift, the payment would be a bribe. Where the company would have
obtained the bid in any event, no criminal behavior would be found. This
analysis makes sense in the context of Middle Eastern bribery laws that forbid
the acceptance of gifts only where those gifts are tied to the performance of
some official or semi-official act. Other local laws, such as civil service
regulations, may prohibit a public official (or his relatives) from accepting any
gift that might be perceived as presenting a conflict of interest [57].
The language of the FCPA is equally vague with respect to the types of
payments that are prohibited. Neither the specific language of the Act nor the
legislative history addresses the issue of whether payment by services or gifts to
relatives would violate the Act. The FCPA forbids "the payment of anything of
value [to a] foreign official.., for the purpose of... influencing any act or
decision of such foreign official... in order to assist [a corporation] in obtaining
or retaining business..." [58]. Broadly construed, the Act might prohibit the
use of entertainment or services as a means to obtain a contract [59]. Payments
and gifts to the relatives of the official, when made with "corrupt" intent, are
even more likely to fall within the scope of the Act. Such payments, of course,
are completely contrary to the policy underlying the legislation and courts are
likely to construe the Act broadly when confronted with payments to third
parties.
2.4. Does the purpose of the payor render the payment unlawfid?
Successful prosecution of bribery under the FCPA and Middle Eastern law
requires a showing that the payor's purpose was to induce a public official to
misuse his official position in some way. Most Middle Eastern anti-bribery
statutes begin by defining what is "corrupt" behavior on the part of public
officials [60] (e.g. the acceptance of cash for the non-performance of a duty).
Under a clause which usually follows, the person who makes the payment for
the purpose of corrupting that official is guilty of giving a bribe [61]. The
FCPA requires that payments must be made "corruptly" [621 in order to be
prohibited. Although "corruptly" is not defined in the Act, the legislative
history states:
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The word "corruptly" is used in order to make clear that the offer, payment, promise, or gift, must
be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position in order to wrongfully direct
business to the payor or his client, or to obtain preferential legislation or a favorable regulation.
The word 'corruptly" connotes an evil motive or purpose, an intent to wrongfully influence the
recipient. It does not require that the act be fully consummated, or succeed in producing the
desired outcome [631.
Thus, payments made solely for the purpose of establishing goodwill between a
corporation and a Middle Eastern government are not likely to be considered
"corrupt" under either set of laws and would therefore not give rise to liability
as illegal bribes [64].
Notwithstanding their common requirement of "corrupt" behavior. Middle
Eastern anti-bribery law and the FCPA differ markedly in scope. This dif-
ference results from the Act's further refinement of the legal significance of the
payor's purpose. The bribery laws of the Middle Easte quite naturally focus
upon the impact that illegal payments make on the social and political system
of a given country. Understandably, therefore, Middle Eastern law does not
contemplate an analysis into the reasons underlying the payor's desire to
corrupt the public official. The FCPA, however, places strong emphasis on the
motivation behind the business payment. The Act incorporates a "business
purpose" test which makes it clear that, in order to be prohibited, a payment
must not only be "corrupt" but must be made to "assist [the corporation or
business] in obtaining or retaining business..." [65]. Given this added limita-
tion, the FCPA criminalizes a significantly smaller number of corporate
payments than its Middle Eastern counterparts which arguably apply to all
payments that have the effect of "corrupting" public officials, even where those
payments are not made to obtain or retain business. Thus, a corrupt payment
made to a public official in order to avoid criminal prosecution of a corporate
employee is probably not prohibited by the FCPA because of the "business
purpose" limitation. The same payment, however, is illegal in most Middle
Eastern jurisdictions [66].
An American businessman abroad may make a questionable payment for a
variety of reasons. He may seek to obtain or retain business, reduce political
risks, avoid harassment, reduce taxes, or simply induce official action [67].
When classified according to the underlying purpose of the payor, the pay-
ments fall into three major categories: aggressive payments, defensive pay-
ments, and facilitating or "grease" payments [68].
2.4.1. Aggressive payments
Simply defined, an aggressive payment is one made directly in exchange for
new business [69]. A typical example of an aggressive payment would involve a
U.S. aircraft corporation making a large contribution to a Middle Eastern
minister of defense in order to secure a government contract to purchase
airplanes. Under Middle Eastern law such a payment would invariably be
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illegal as its purpose is to "corrupt" the foreign official (i.e. influence his
decision). The "business purpose" test of the FCPA is also satisfied because
the "aggressive payment", by definition, is made to assist the corporation in
"obtaining business".
Because the definition of "corrupt" behavior may vary from nation to
nation, it has been suggested that under the FCPA a "relative definition" of
the term should be devised which would be flexible enough to comply with the
laws .of that nation whose official has been bribed [70]. The "multinational
context of the FCPA", it is stated, "mandates that 'corruptly' should mean
knowingly and wilfully intending to influence a foreign nation's decision-
making through a payment forbidden by that nation's laws" [71]. Such an
interpretation, however, is flawed in two respects. First, it is clear that the
intent of Congress was to avoid the incorporation of foreign law into the
FCPA. As originally introduced by Senator Proxmire, the Act would have
forbidden any payments that were "illegal under the laws of a foreign
government having jurisdiction over the transaction" [72]. Recognizing the
difficulty of interpreting foreign bribery laws, Congress enacted the FCPA into
law without the foreign law provision. This course of action would also make
sense in light of the fact that local bribery laws generally prohibit a wider
range of "corrupt" activity than does the FCPA. A definition of "corrupt"
behavior based on foreign law would, contrary to congressional intent, expand
rather than limit the scope of the FCPA.
2.4.2. Defensive payments
Although aggressive payments will ordinarily be unlawful, payments which
are defensively motivated are often much more difficult to classify. Defensive
payments are defined as those which are motivated by a wish to avoid
threatened adverse governmental action [73]. When accompanied by an ele-
ment of duress (such as in true extortion situations) payments may well be
lawful. For instance, money paid in order to avoid physical or personal
harassment is not generally criminal under the laws of most Middle East
nations and the FCPA because the payments are not corrupt [74]. Construed
broadly, certain Middle Eastern bribery statutes arguably would exonerate
payments made in response to threats of a physical or economic nature. Article
:143 of the Iranian Criminal Code, for instance, provided that:
Should it be established that the person offering a bribe was forced to bribe in order to protect his
legitimate rights he shall be exempt from punishment [75].
Other statutes, such as Morocco's, arguably rule out any defense of physical or
economic coercion:
Any person, who, in order to obtain the performance or non-performance of an act ... yields to
solicitations leading to bribery, even though not initiated by him, and regardless of the effect
thereof, he shall also be punished by the same punishment given to bribed persons ... [76].
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol4/iss2/1
PJ. Suse / Questionable pamnents in the Middle East
However, in most Middle Eastern jurisdictions it is unclear whether economic
coercion will serve as a defense. When faced with a threat of economic
coercion by Middle Eastern officials, a U.S. corporation may consider making
the requested payment and immediately confessing to higher authorities since
several Middle Eastern nations have laws which exonerate a briber who
subsequently confesses [77]. The advisability of this action, of course, assumes
the existence of a higher authority who is willing to prosecute the official who
made the threats.
The status of coerced payments under the FCPA is not clear from the
language of the Act. Under the U.S. domestic bribery statutes, proof of
economic coercion is not allowed as a complete defense, although the defen-
dant is entitled to have the jury consider the coercion as bearing on his
"intent" [78]. Similarly, the FCPA "corrupt" intent requirement was ap-
parently intended to exempt only payments made in response to true ex-
tortionist threats. This view was clarified in the Senate Report:
The defense that the payment was demanded on the part of a government official as a price for
gaining entry into a market or to obtain a contract would not suffice since at some point the U.S.
company would make a conscious decision whether or not to pay a bribe ... On the other hand
true extortion situations would not be covered by this provision since a payment to an official to
keep an oil rig from being dynamited should not be held to be made with the requisite corrupt
purpose 179].
It remains to be seen whether the Act will be held to prohibit payments made
in response to threats of an economic nature that are made after a business has
obtained a government contract abroad but before it has been paid. A
spokesman for the Department of Justice, however, has indicated that the
Department intends to prosecute despite any claims of economic extortion by
the paying company [80].
2.4.3. "Grease" payments
"Grease" payments are made for the purprose of facilitating the perfor-
mance of non-discretionary actions by low-level public officials and are not
intended to secure new business. The typical grease payment, therefore, is
made to persuade the civil servant to carry out a function or service which he is
obliged to perform as part of his government responsibilities, but which he
may refuse or delay unless compensated. Examples of facilitating payments set
forth in the congressional reports include payments for (i) expediting ship-
ments through customs; (ii) placing transatlantic phone calls; (iii) securing
required permits; and (iv) obtaining adequate police protection.
Congress included three clauses in the FCPA, any one of which would
probably exclude such payments from coverage under the Act. First, as
discussed above, the Act does not apply to payments to low-level government
employees [81]. Secondly, grease payments would be exempt since, by defini-
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tion, they are only indirectly intended to "obtain or retain business" [82).
Finally, a grease payment is not "corrupt" because it does not involve the
performance of "discretionary actions" by a public official [83]. As noted
above, however, grease payments are illegal in every Middle Eastern jurisdic-
tion. Notwithstanding this prohibition, however, the practice remains
widespread in that area of the world.
3. Penalties
In most Middle Eastern states the offer or payment of a bribe is punishable
by fines and imprisonment usually not exceeding five years' imprisonment [84].
Noteworthy exceptions here are Egypt, where the penalty can be life imprison-
ment at hard labor [85], and Tunisia, where the bribery statute never mentions
a punishment for bribers [86]. In many Middle Eastern nations such as Saudi
Arabia, provisions exist that call for lesser penalties should the bribe go
unaccepted [87]. Penalties may be increased in some jurisdictions if the public
official has been requested to refrain from performing an official duty [88] as
opposed to merely performing a duty. Finally, if the purpose of the bribe was
the commission of an act punishable by a penalty more severe than the one for
bribery, then the person offering the bribe may be punished by the penalty
prescribed by law for that crime [89].
In addition to fines and imprisonment, a U.S. corporation offering a bribe
may find itself subject to potentially more damaging penalties. In Saudi
Arabia, for instance, a foreign firm was recently banned from operating in the
Kingdom [90]. The penalty was apparently imposed pursuant to article 12 of
the Saudi Arabian bribery regulations which provide that anyone convicted of
bribery "shall be denied ... admittance to any adjudication, public import
license, public work contracts, government contracts or any other public
authority, whether through practice or contracting" [91]. Although the imposi-
tion of such a penalty would appear to be a more effective bribery deterrent
than imprisonment or fines, few Middle Eastern governments have included
such a provision in their bribery laws.
The sections setting forth the penalties imposed for violation of the anti-
bribery provisions of the FCPA state that a corporation or business (i.e. not an
individual) can be fined up to $1 million. An individual who is either a
"domestic concern" or an officer, director, or shareholder acting on behalf of
an enterprise can be fined up to $10,000, and imprisoned for a maximum of
five years [92]. In order to protect lower level employees from being scapegoats
for the corporation, these individuals can be punished for violating the Act
only if it is found that the company itself has done so [93]. Finally, the FCPA
prohibits the corporation from indemnifying any individual convicted of
violating the Act [94].
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The final topic of this subsection concerns the crime of offering a bribe. In
all but two of the Middle East jurisdictions a businessman who offers an illegal
payment will be liable as a briber regardless of whether or not the payment is
accepted [95]. More often than not, however, the mere offering of a bribe will
be less severely punished if the bribe is not accepted [96].
4. Bribery statutes: Enforcement
The enforcement record of the bribery laws examined herein has been
inconsistent at best. Despite the evidence of widespread questionable payments
to high level officials in the Middle East in the past decade, there have been
relatively few publicized investigations regarding the propriety of these pay-
ments [97]. Enforcement against lower level bribery, on the other hand, has
been fairly common in countries such as Saudi Arabia.
For a variety of reasons, a government may choose not to initiate or follow
through with the prosecution or investigation of a company, agent, or public
official who has apparently violated bribery laws. Very often such governmen-
tal restraint is the result of pressing political interests which are likely to be
endangered by the publicity accompanying a major bribery scandal. In other
instances the authorities simply may be unable to meet the burden of proof
imposed by bribery laws because of the difficult questions of international law
and comity that the gathering of evidence is likely to entail [98].
4.1. The Middle East nations
In the Middle East political considerations will often dictate the intensity
with which local anti-bribery laws are enforced. Operating on weak political
foundations, many Middle Eastern governments could not survive a bribery
scandal of the magnitude experienced in the Netherlands, Japan or Italy [99].
Indeed, it is widely recognized that, until the rash of bribery disclosures in the
mid-1970s, Middle Eastern governments tended to overlook questionable
payments. In recent years, however, a number of Middle Eastern nations have
undertaken well publicized anti-corruption campaigns designed to boost the
political image of the government at home and abroad [100]. Although such
investigations have not resulted in major criminal convictions of U.S. business-
men, the apparent shift in enforcement policies indicates that the possibility is
no longer a remote one.
Despite indications of a growing willingness to prosecute violations of
anti-bribery laws, local authorities in the Middle East face significant jurisdic-
tional obstacles raised because suspected bribers and evidence are often
located outside of the prosecuting country. As demonstrated by an application
of Middle Eastern law to the following hypothetical case, obtaining and
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enforcing a judgment against a foreign corporation or individual often involves
questions that extend beyond the realm of domestic law and domestic enforce-
ment policy.
An American employee of a large U.S. corporation, following the instructions
of "high level" officers of the corporation makes a large cash payment to a
cabinet member of State X while he is travelling outside of X. The payment
induces the official to award the corporation a lucrative government contract.
The official, however, confesses to the crime and implicates the employee and
the corporation. Claiming a violation of its bribery laws, the government of X
seeks to prosecute the employee, the officers and the corporation.
In the analysis which follows, the above case is examined throughout in the
context of Turkish law.
Assuming that the evidence obtained from the official is sufficient to meet
the government's burden of proof under the local anti-bribery law, the initial
question is whether, under the law of X, a corporation can be criminally liable
for the payment of a bribe. Unlike many modern European penal codes [101],
the Turkish code, for example, contains nothing which explicitly provides for
criminal liability of a corporation. Notwithstanding this omission, however,
corporations in Turkey are legal persons capable of doing anything in law that
a natural person can do [102]. Thus, it is likely this initial question will be
resolved in favor of the government prosecutor.
A second major consideration concerns the application of the law of State X
to criminal behavior outside of X. Again, an application of Turkish law is
instructive. Although the Turkish criminal code has adopted the "principle of
territoriality" as its general rule [103], it contains exceptions that arguably
extend its jurisdiction to prescribe laws regarding the actions of corporate
officers who have never set foot in Turkey and corporate employees who make
payments to Turkish officials outside of Turkey. The question of the extraterri-
torial payments is covered by article4 of the Turkish penal code which states
that "[wjhoever commits a felony [e.g. bribery] during and in connection with
the performance of an officer or mission on behalf of Turkey in foreign
countries shall be prosecuted in Turkey" [1041. The application of Turkish law
to the corporate officers is provided for in article 6 of the code:
A foreigner who commits a felony ... in a foreign country, against Turkey or a Turk. entailing
punishment restricting liberty for a minimum authorized period of one year under Turkish law.
shall be punished according to Turkish laws, if he is in Turkey [105].
The final phrase in article 6 suggests that Turkey does not have jurisdiction
to enforce its bribery laws against an American corporation and employees
who are not in Turkey. Of the Middle Eastern nations examined here, Turkey
is among those three that have signed an extradition treaty with the United
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States that includes bribery as an extraditable offense [106]. However, the
treaty provides for extradition only where the offense was committed in a
territory subject to the jurisdiction of the requesting party (i.e. Turkey).
Assuming the reference to "jurisdiction" here means "enforcement jurisdiction",
then the U.S. would not be bound to extradite because the payments were
made outside Turkey. Moreover, article V of the Turkish treaty provides that
the signatories are not bound to extradite one of their own nationals under the
treaty [107]. It seems likely that, even if the illicit acts were committed in
Turkey, the Department of Justice would prosecute under the FCPA rather
than extradite since the hypothetical payment is clearly forbidden by the Act
[108].
Assuming that it is impossible to extradite the Americans, and that service
of a summons upon them would be useless, Turkish law permits the authorities
to try the defendants in absentia [109]. Under this procedure, service of process
is achieved by simply attaching a copy of the summons to the courthouse wall
for two weeks [110]. Turkish law also provides that the defendants may be
represented in absentia by counsel of their own choice [111]. While no
punishment of imprisonment can be declared upon a judgment rendered in
absentia, any property of the corporation or the other defendants can be
attached and disposed of upon the death of the absentee [1121. Finally, if the
Americans are subsequently arrested in Turkey, they may be entitled to a trial
de novo [113]. In the unlikely event that the Turkish government seeks to
enforce the above judgment in the United States, it is probable that any
American court would refuse to act as an enforcement organ for the criminal
legislation of another jurisdiction [114].
Notwithstanding this lack of judicial assistance, a judgment rendered in
Turkey may have various legal consequences in the United States [115]. The
most important of these involves the question of double jeopardy [116]. Under
the circumstances described above, the double jeopardy principle arguably
would not bar a prosecution of the same defendants under the FCPA for the
same act since neither the U.S. Constitution nor the FCPA requires that a
Turkish criminal judgment be given greater effect [117]. The reverse situation is
covered by the Turkish Criminal Code which gives the Minister of Justice the
authority to try the Americans in Turkey even after a successful prosecution
under the FCPA [118]. If the punishment imposed in the U.S. is less than that
required by the Turkish code, then the difference will be served in Turkey
should the Americans ever return there [119].
4.2. Enforcement of the FCPA
The responsibility for enforcing the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA is
divided between the SEC and the Department of Justice [120]. As the House of
Representatives indicated in its report, the SEC is in charge of investigations of
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violations under section 103 (violations by issuers and reporting companies)
[121]. Should the case require criminal prosecution, it is placed in the hands of
the Department of Justice. Violations of section 104 of the Act (by non-
reporting domestic concerns) are both investigated and prosecuted by the
Justice Department. In addition to the efforts of these bodies, the prosecution
of U.S. companies abroad is augmented by an Executive Order that provides
that senior officials of American foreign intelligence agencies must report to
-the Attorney General any evidence of possible violations of federal criminal
laws such as the FCPA [122]. Such reports cannot be the result of an active
search for evidence, but would arguably come from the "passive" receipt of
evidence which comes to the attention of the agency [123]. The mechanisms
available to the SEC to enforce the Act are the same as those provided by
other securities laws and include the use of civil injunctions and administrative
hearings [124].
In spite of the competent enforcement machinery that exists under the
FCPA, the government has initiated relatively few prosecutions under the
bribery provisions of the Act [125]. This is attributable, in part, to the stringent
nature of the required proof. As noted above, the Act requires proof that the
payor had "reason to know" that the payment would be used for corrupt
purposes. Given the nature of the behavior prohibited by the FCPA, it is likely
that important evidence will be located abroad in the hands of U.S. nationals,
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, or foreign nationals [126]. Under
U.S. law, an American citizen residing abroad may be served with a subpoena
requiring him to appear in court and, if necessary, produce relevant documents
in his possession [127]. Similarly, any documents over which a U.S. parent
corporation has control may be subpoenaed from a foreign subsidiary or
branch office abroad [128]. However, the courts have modified such subpoenas
in the name of "international comity" where compliance would violate foreign
law and where there has been a good faith effort to comply [129].
Obtaining testimony and other evidence from a foreign national who is
located outside of the United States may be somewhat more difficult. In most
cases, the investigation of questionable payments abroad will depend, in large
part, on the cooperation of foreign individuals or governments [130]. For
instance, in order to obtain documentary evidence from a foreign national, the
U.S. government would seek judicial assistance through a letter rogatory [ 31 ].
It is a generally accepted principle of international law, however, that a nation
is not compelled to provide such judicial assistance in criminal matters [132].
Moreover, there are no treaties between the United States and Middle Eastern
nations that provide for judicial assistance in criminal matters. Thus, a Middle
Eastern government's compliance with such a request is likely to depend upon
the sensitivity of the documents requested and the political stability of the
government in question. In the event that the United States is unable to
compel a foreign witness to testify in a FCPA enforcement proceeding, serious
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constitutional questions may be raised concerning the accused's right to
confront adverse witnesses [133].
Although the major criterion for choosing among cases to prosecute will
ultimately be the strength of the available evidence and the chances for
obtaining additional needed evidence [134], the government may refrain from
prosecution on policy grounds. The SEC, for instance, has reportedly dropped
cases or investigations for reasons of national security. On April 8, 1980, the
Wall Street Journal reported that, at the request of the CIA, the SEC had
decided to drop foreign bribery charges brought in 1978 against Page Airways
Inc. According to the Journal the charges against Page and six corporate
executives were dropped and the case settled in order to avoid the risk of
exposing an overseas intelligence-gathering mission in which Page participated
by paying large sales commissions to foreign officials deemed friendly to the
U.S. [135]. Page reportedly agreed to a settlement that included an order
prohibiting it from future violations of the securities laws, and also requiring it
to conduct an internal study of the payments [136]. In addition to the concern
for considerations of national security, enforcement priorities are apparently
determined by the nature of the competition abroad and the general attitude of
the foreign country whose officials the payment is designed to influence. In a
recent speech, Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heymann indicated that
the Department of Justice will consider payments to be less serious (and
presumably less likely to be prosecuted) where an American company is not in
direct competition with other American companies, but with foreign compa-
nies who also make illegal payments but are not subject to the FCPA [137].
Heymann also indicated that the Department of Justice will be more likely to
prosecute when bribes are being offered in a country which is trying to "clean
up" its own act [138].
A less expensive method of enforcing the FCPA is to allow the private
sector to regulate itself. Although the Act does not explicitly create a private
right of action, federal courts could create such a right or Congress could
amend the FCPA to allow for such actions [139]. The creation of such a right is
unlikely, however, and strong arguments against establishing a private right of
action have been put forward [140].
5. Other laws designed to reduce the incidence of bribery
5.1. The Middle East
The problems encountered by Middle Eastern governments in drafting and
enforcing domestic bribery statutes has prompted attempts to reduce corrup-
tion in these nations through non-criminal legislation. In contrast to the penal
codes which define and explicitly prohibit corrupt behavior, these relatively
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recent measures are designed to help businessmen and public officials avoid
the occasion to sin by discouraging those situations in which bribery is most
likely to flourish. For instance, it has been noted that the use of commercial
agents by companies seeking government contracts can present serious ob-
stacles to both the application and enforcement of criminal bribery statutes.
With this in mind, certain Middle Eastern governments in recent years have
taken steps to de-emphasize the importance of local agents. Although this
method constitutes the most popular complement to the criminalization of
bribery, other methods of reducing bribery have also been employed and are
discussed below.
The analysis that follows is based on the following set of inquiries applied
primarily to the commercial agency laws of each of the Middle Eastern nations
surveyed:
1. Must a foreign company employ a local commercial agent before conduct-
ing business in that country?
2. Is there a law or regulation prohibiting the use of commercial agents in
certain government or non-government contracts? Is the law or regulation
limited to contracts which call for the government to purchase certain goods
(e.g. weapons)?
3. Is there a law or regulation that limits the amount or place of payment of a
commercial agent's commission or fee?
4. What other methods are employed to provide a disincentive to bribery? Are
sealed bids and public tenders required in government contracts? Does the
law reward employee integrity? Are "no bribery" affidavits required in
government contracts?
5. Other methods?
As noted above, foreign businesses operating in the Middle East may be
required to employ a local commercial agent. Foreign businesses seeking
government contracts may be required to retain a local agent in five Middle
Eastern countries [141]. Those companies seeking to sell goods or services in
the private sector may also be required to act through an agent in five of the
jurisdictions surveyed here [142]. The use of an agent is completely forbidden
in only one Middle Eastern jurisdiction [143]. In those nations where agents
may be retained, it is usually required that the agency relationship be reg-
istered with the government [144]. In addition, these same governments often
empower a cabinet-level official to prohibit, at his discretion, the use of agents
in transactions with his particular ministry [145].
In the hope of reducing corruption, several Middle Eastern governments, in
recent years, have amended their commercial agency laws by prohibiting the
use of or payment to commercial agents or their functional equivalents in
certain situations [146], such as the purchase and service of military goods
[147]. The scope of these laws varies widely. For instance, the Saudi Arabian
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Regulation on Service Agents [ 148] requires that foreign contractors who have
no Saudi partner must appoint Saudi agents to represent them in their dealings
with the Saudi government. Article4 of the Regulation, however, prohibits the
use of agents in "armament contracts and services related thereto" [149]. In
Algeria the law is applied broadly to cover all contracts whether or not the
government is a party. Any violation of these decrees will often subject the
foreign corporation and its agent to the penalties provided for in the bribery or
corruption articles of the penal code [150].
In addition to the prohibition of certain agency relationships, Middle
Eastern nations have used other methods to encourage more direct relations
between government entities and foreign firms. Saudi Arabia, for instance, has
recently established a new licensing procedure which allows foreign firms
already doing business in the Kingdom to establish a local "representative
office" [151]. While these offices are prohibited from conducting any com-
mercial activity other than liaison work, such developments may even further
reduce the activity of commercial agents and possibly the incidence of bribery.
These recently promulgated rules concerning the use of agents, like the
bribery laws, have given rise to some important problems in interpretation.
Jordan, for instance, recently amended its commercial agency law to prohibit
the use of an agent in the purchase, import or sale of any arms or spare parts
to the military [152]. The law, however, does not define "arms or spare parts".
The question has arisen, therefore, whether the use of an agent is prohibited in
the sale of goods that, strictly speaking, are not arms but that nonetheless will
be used by the military. Common examples of such goods include trucks and
communications equipment destined for military use. The Jordanian govern-
ment recently removed this uncertainty by interpreting the law to apply only to
firearms, and not to other equipment [153]. A similar problem arises concern-
ing the Saudi Arabian regulation that prohibits the use of agents in armament
contracts "and services related thereto" [154]. Due to a lack of any governmen-
tal interpretation as to the scope of the term "related services", cautious
companies would be well advised to refrain from employing an agent in
situations that arguably relate to armament contracts.
Another method designed to discourage large payoffs (part of which might
be passed on to public officials) is the imposition of ceilings on the amount of
"commissions" or "fees" that can be paid to commercial agents. To date, only
Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi have enacted such rules. The Saudi regulation,
for instance, states that such "fees" cannot "exceed five percent of the total
cost of the contract the foreign contractor is executing" [155]. In Abu Dhabi
ceilings range from 2% on transactions not exceeding $2.64 million to 1% on
transactions exceeding $13.2 million [156].
Predictably, local agents in the Gulf have not been content with these
limitations and have devised ways to avoid them [157]. First, an agent may
attempt to distinguish his agency fee from other "extra" services which would
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not be subject to the ceiling [158]. Under such a view, higher remuneration
would be allowable for the performance of identified services that are above
and beyond those "sponsorship" services specifically tied to the acquisition
and performance of a government contract. A second and related method is for
the agent to seek the maximum commission allowable for pre-contract services
and later increase the percentage for post-contract logistical support (e.g. visas,
housing, etc.) [159]. Other tactics include attempts to conceal the agency
relationship and thereby avoid the ceilings which do not apply to other
business relationships such as "local distributorships" or "joint ventures" [160].
Under Saudi Arabian law, for instance, there is no limit on the percentage of
profits which a Saudi co-adventurer can take from a business enterprise with a
foreign corporation. Because joint ventures are exempt from the requirement
that foreign businesses employ an agent, a situation is created whereby the
"agent" takes his fee (at over 5%) as a co-adventurer [161].
With respect to the first two methods of avoiding a ceiling on agency fees,
the law and practice in Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia create some uncertainty.
Current local practice and usage in Abu Dhabi, for instance, seem to indicate
that there may be circumstances in which it would be permissible to com-
pensate local agents in an amount in excess of the 2% limitation. It has been
reported that contracts calling for amounts in excess of 2% have been accepted
for registration by local authorities with respect to the performance of duties
that are not strictly of a sponsorship nature. Thus, under this view, if the local
sponsor/agent agrees to perform functions beyond those generally regarded as
being sponsorship services, the 2% limitation would not apply thereto. The
validity of this distinction seems questionable, however, since the Abu Dhabi
regulation uses the word "agent" rather than "sponsor". It would appear,
therefore, that a broader reading of the term to include all services performed
by the agent is more appropriate.
Even assuming the applicability of the above distinction, it is often unclear
whether services are of a strictly sponsorship nature. With respect to the
application of article 8 of the Abu Dhabi law there is agreement among local
practitioners only as to which services are obviously in the nature of strict
sponsorship and those which obviously fall outside that category. First, the 2%
limitation will be applied to services directly tied to an acquisition of a specific
government contract. These include the use by a foreign company of its local
agent's name to qualify for a government tender, as well as the identification of
the tender, the obtaining of the tender documents and the submission of the
tender. At the other extreme, it would appear that a foreign company may
reimburse its agent in amounts in excess of the maximum, for direct out-of-
pocket expenses of the agent, incurred for example in providing temporary
office space for the foreign company.
With respect to types of services that fall between these two extremes, there
is no definite method for distinguishing pure sponsorship from the broader
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notion of agency services the payment for which is arguably not subject to the
2% limitation. Once one accepts the "sponsorship" distinction, then, it appears
that as the services become less specifically identified to particular government
tenders, a stronger case can be made in support of the permissibility of
additional compensation.
In addition to limiting the amounts payable to local agents, some Middle
Eastern governments have sought to discourage payments into foreign bank
accounts by enacting laws that restrict the places in which commissions may be
paid. Jordan, for instance, does not limit commission rates, but has a strict
foreign exchange control law that prohibits the payment of commissions to
Jordanian nationals outside of the home country [162]. Thus, in such jurisdic-
tions payments should be made by bank transfer or by check mailed to the
address of the agent in his home country. In other jurisdictions, such as
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Abu Dhabi, the place of payment is irrelevant.
These countries are without foreign exchange laws; and their nationals are
permitted to maintain foreign bank accounts and are not reqibired to report the
same or to sell foreign currency to any entity at home. Even in nations such as
Egypt where foreign exchange laws are in force [163] a foreign company would
not violate the law if it paid a local agent in foreign currency by depositing
funds in the agent's account outside of Egypt. However, it may be shown that
the company intended to aid in the evasion of taxes by the agent, thereby
violating Egyptian law.
Although most efforts to reduce corruption by prophylactic means have
focused on the behavior and use of commercial agents, some Middle Eastern
governments have sought other ways to discourage those situations in which
bribery is most likely to flourish. One such method is to reduce the amount of
administerial discretion involved in the awarding of government contracts.
Where a single government representative is granted the sole power to negoti-
ate and award large government contracts a climate favorable to bribery has
been created [164]. In response to this common practice in the Middle East,
commentators have suggested that local authorities require that competing
foreign businesses submit sealed bids to be opened publicly by a committee of
officials who would then act on the bids [165]. This is the practice in Kuwait,
for instance, where extensive regulations require such public tenders in all
contracts with government ministries and departments [ 166]. However, in other
Middle Eastern states, such as Saudi Arabia, public tenders are often required
on an ad hoc basis.
Other efforts to reduce corruption include a Saudi Arabian law that requires
that the government reward persons who provide information leading to a
bribery conviction as well as those public officials who refuse bribes in the
course of their duties [167]. Middle Eastern nations have also increased their
efforts to publicize their bribery laws and alert foreign businesses to rules
regarding questionable payments. Iran, for instance, required foreign compa-
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
P.J. Suse / Questionable payments in the Middle East
nies selling to the government to complete and sign a form affidavit stating,
among other things, that no money or fees were paid to secure the contract. In
Syria, foreign companies may be asked to submit a written declaration that no
"broker or mediator" has been employed. Similarly, in Algeria every foreign
company that concludes a contract with the Algerian government or with any
organization controlled by the Algerian government must provide in its con-
tract a clause entitled "exclusion of intermediaries". This clause must state
specifically that the contract was entered into without the mediation of an
agent. Under Algerian law failure to include this clause in the contract renders
the contract null and void. Moreover, the use of an agent in contravention of
these provisions may subject the foreign company to criminal sanctions [168].
5.2. The United States
The remainder of this article is devoted to a brief outline of the additional
existing U.S. law that is relevant to the question of U.S. corporate payments in
the Middle East [169]. Although many of these provisions are of great
importance to American businesses operating abroad, the list is too long and
the provisions too complex to be treated in detail here.
A major piece of legislation in this area concerns the second prong of the
FCPA regulation of corporate misconduct abroad [170]. Under subsection (A)
of that provision SEC registrants and reporting companies are required to
"make and keep books, records, and accounts, which in reasonable detail,
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions. and disposition of assets" [171].
Subsection (B) requires those companies to "devise and maintain a system of
internal accounting control sufficient to provide assurances that ... transac-
tions are recorded as necessary to maintain accountability for assets" [172].
Although the policy underlying the accounting provisions is the elimination of
bookkeeping devices designed to conceal illegal payments abroad [173], this
section of the Act is not limited to payments abroad but is applicable to wholly
domestic business activities devoid of foreign bribery implications [174]. If a
company fails to comply with the accounting provisions, the enterprise, along
with its officers, may be subject to criminal liability [175] and a civil action
may be brought by the SEC [176]. Anyone acting in cooperation with the head
of any federal department or agency in matters concerning the national
security will be exempt from the accounting provisions in certain instances
[177].
Unfortunately, it is not always clear what constitutes compliance with the
accounting provisions of the Act. In a speech outlining SEC policy on
compliance and enforcement of the accounting provisions, Chairman Harold
Williams acknowledged that ambiguities in the statute were causing some
businesses to be overly cautious in seeking compliance with the Act [178].
Noting the "debilitating effect" that this uncertainty has had on business
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resources, Williams indicated that the SEC will not challenge "reasonable
business decisions" on compliance with the Act and that "inadvertent record
keeping mistakes" will not give rise to Commission enforcement proceedings
[ 179]. Notwithstanding Chairman Williams' remarks, however, there is growing
pressure to amend the FCPA accounting requirements [180].
With the exception of the FCPA, no U.S. law is aimed directly at preventing
international payoffs by American corporations. Although legislation does
exist that, in certain limited cases, could give rise to civil or criminal liability
for bribery abroad, the legislative history of the FCPA indicates that Congress
believes even the most vigorous application of these laws would not signifi-
cantly deter payoffs by U.S. corporations abroad. The most important of these
non-FCPA laws are the disclosure requirements of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
[181]. Although these have been used by the SEC in actions against U.S.
corporations making payments abroad [1821, their effectiveness in this area has
been limited. In a letter to Senator William Proxmire (the sponsor of the
FCPA) the President's Task Force on Questionable Corporate Payments
Abroad outlined the reasons supporting this view [183].
First, SEC disclosure requirements apply only to public companies reg-
istered under the 1934 Act or to those making a public offering. According to
the Task Force letter, this extends to less than one-third of all U.S. companies
doing business abroad [184]. Secondly, the disclosure requirements apply only
to the extent that the questionable payment is "material". After considering
the broad SEC interpretations of the term the Task Force expressed serious
doubts as to the legality of the views of the Commission [185]. The final point
noted in the letter was the fact that the SEC does not require a corporation to
disclose the names of the recipients of questionable payments. Based on these
considerations, the Task Force concluded that the disclosure requirements
were "not an appropriate mechanism to deal with the full array of national
concerns caused by the problem of questionable payments" [186].
In addition to the securities laws, the anti-trust and tax laws are also
applicable to foreign payoffs. The usefulness of these laws is limited, however.
in that they apply only to the extent that the questionable payment is a
violation of the specific statute in question. Section 162(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code provides that taxpayers may not deduct bribes and kickbacks in
computing their taxable income if the payment would be unlawful in the U.S.
Thus, by limiting its scope to the narrow tax-related problem of business
expense deductions, the federal tax law does not actually prohibit the improper
payments. Similarly, anti-trust laws are not applicable to foreign payments,
unless there has been an anti-competitive effect on U.S. commerce abroad
[187]. The Task Force further noted "substantial constraints on the justicia-
bility and enforceability of the application of the antitrust laws to foreign
transactions" [188]. Ironically, these constraints are very similar to those
limiting the effectiveness of the FCPA and include the sovereign immunity of
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foreign governments and considerations of comity between nations [189].
Other areas of U.S. law that bear on the question of international payoffs
are found in the sections relating to the Export-Import Bank of the United
States (Eximbank), the Agency for International Development (AID) and the
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. The
regulations of the Eximbank require U.S. firms to file a report detailing the
commissions paid on any sale financed with loans from that institution [190].
American exporters who make a sale under the AID program must file a
supplier's certificate which asserts that no kickbacks or commissions were paid
[191]. Under the 1976 amendments to the Foreign Military Sales Act, a U.S.
corporation selling military material abroad must fully disclose all information
regarding any "payment, contribution, gift, commission or fee" paid in consid-
eration for such a sale. The amendments also grant the President the power to
limit or prohibit the conditions of such sales [192].
6. Conclusion
Anti-bribery legislation has proliferated in the United States and the Middle
East during the years since Chairman Hills expressed concern regarding the
legal uncertainties facing U.S. corporations operating abroad [193]. As a result,
American businessmen making payments in the Middle East must be aware of
the particular mandates of a growing body of domestic and foreign law.
Although promulgating governments have made efforts to provide clearer
guidelines for corporate behavior, many areas of U.S. and Middle Eastern law
remain vague and uncertain. This uncertainty poses a danger to U.S. business-
men conducting business in the Middle East. While the attending anxieties can
be eliminated only through further clarification by the governmental organs
charged with their enforcement, the problem may be alleviated pending such
action by obtaining a working familiarity with the language of the relevant
statutes in their present form, coupled with a knowledge of prevailing patterns
of enforcement. This article, it is hoped, has contributed to achievement of
these goals.
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[100] As recently as December 16, 1979, four Iraqis were hanged and two others sentenced to
life imprisonment after being convicted of receiving bribes in return for restricted information.
Two of the men executed were senior public officials while the other two were private business-
men. Those receiving life sentences were a government legal adviser and an attorney in the private
sector. The severe penalties apparently were the result of the fact that the acts requested of the
bribed officials were subject to penalties greater than those prescribed for bribery. Reported in
Mid. E. Exec. Repts. (February 1980) at 8.
[101] The Dutch Penal Code, Wetboek Van Strafreeht, art. 51, for instance states:
1) Natural persons and legal entities can commit crimes.
2) If a legal entity commits a crime, the prosecution and statutory punishment and measures, if
appropriate can be directed:
a) against such legal entity, or
b) against those who have given an order for the fact and those who have actually been in
charge of the prohibited action, or,
c) against those mentioned under a) and b) jointly.
[102] Ansay and Wallace, Jr., Introduction to Turkish Law (Ankara, 1978) at 100.
[103] "Whoever commits a crime in Turkey shall be punished in accordance with Turkish law
", Turkish Criminal Code of March i, 1926, art. 3.
[104] Id. art. 4.
[105] Id. art. 6.
[106] The others are Egypt, Israel and Iraq. Of these, only the treaties with Israel and Iraq
include bribery as an extraditable offense. See Extradition Treaty with Turkey, August 18, 1934,49
Stat. 2692, T.S. No. 872; Extradition Treaty with Israel, December 5, 1963, T.I.A.S. No. 5476, 484
U.N.T.S. 283; Extradition Treaty with Iraq, April 23, 1936, 49 Stat. 3380, T.S. No. 907;
Extradition Treaty with the Ottoman Empire (Egypt), April 22, 1875, 59 Stat. 572; T.S. No. 270.
[107] Extradition Treaty with Turkey, art. V, supra note 106. Only the treaty with Israel
requires the signatories to extradite their own nationals.
[108] See discussion in section 2.2.1 supra regarding "aggressive payments".
[109] The Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure, arts. 269-88, Stat. No. 1412 of April 4. 1929.
[110] Id. art. 271.
[111] Id. art. 273.
[112] Id. arts. 276-66, 283-86.
[113] Id.
[114] See Pye, The Effect of Foreign Criminal Judgments in the United States, 32 The U. of
Missouri at Kansas City L. Rev. 119 (1964).
[115] For instance, the defendants may suffer the consequences of a domestic multiple
offender statute. See Pye, id. at 127.
[116] Id. at 117-24.
[117] Id.
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[1181 Turkish Criminal Code. art. 4, supra note 103. art. 4.
[ 119] Id. art. 7.
1120] See [19781 466 Sec. Reg. & L. (BNA) A-3. For a more detailed discussion of the division
of these responsibilities see Note. A Congressional Response to the Problem of Questionable
Payments Abroad: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. 10 Law & Policy in Int'l Bus. 1253
(1978) at 1278-93.
[1211 S. Rep. No. 114. supra note 3. at 11-12: H.R. Rep. 640, supra note 2. at 9-10. Believing
that the existing securities laws were adequate to require disclosure of questionable payments
abroad, the SEC expressed initial reluctance to expand its duties to enforce the anti-bribery
provisions of the Act. See Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment
Disclosure: Hearings on S.305 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
95th Cong. Ist Sess. 117 (1977) at 121-22.
[122] United States Foreign Intelligence Activities, Exec. Order No. 12036, 14 Weekly Comp.
of Pres. Doc. 194 (Jan. 24, 1978) at 200. Discussed in Note, supra note 120, at 1278-79.
[1231 Id.
[ 124] S. Rep. No. 114, supra note 3, at I- 12; H.R. Rep. 640, supra note 2, at 9- 10.
[ 125] See generally Note, Effective Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 36 Stan. L.
Rev. 561 (1980). The following cases have been brought under the anti-bribery provisions of the
Act. United States v. Kenny Int'l Corp., [1979] 516 Sec. Reg. & L Rep. (BNA) A-2 (D.D.C.
August 2, 1979); United States v. Carver, [1979] 498 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) A-12 (S.D. Fla.
April 9, 1979); SEC v. Katy Industries, Inc., No. 78-3476 (N.D. I11. August 30, 1978), discussed in
11978] 469 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) at A-4.
[126] For a detailed discussion of the problems of obtaining evidence abroad in the context of
the FCPA, consult Lashbrooke, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Unilateral Solution to an
International Problem, 12 Cornell Int'l L.J. 227 (1979). The brief discussion of the issue in notes
127-134. infra, and corresponding text is based largely on the analysis found in Lashbrooke, id. at
236-43.
[127] 28 U.S.C. §1783(a) (1976). See Lashbrooke, supra note 126, at notes 59-61 and
accompanying text at p. 237. Note, however, that service of process abroad may be objected to by
the country in which the American is served. See Contemporary Practices of the United States
Relating to International Law, 56 Am. J. Int'l. L. 794 (1962).
[128] U.S. v. First National City Bank, 396 F. 2d 897, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1968); see Lashbrooke,
supra note 126, at notes 62-67 and accompanying text at p. 237.
[129] Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F. 2d 61 1, 613 (2d Cir. 1962).
[130] In his letter to Senator Proxmire, Eliot Richardson noted that "(s)uccessful prosecutions
of offenses would typically depend on witnesses and information beyond the reach of U.S. judicial
process. Other nations, rather than assist in such prosecutions might resist cooperation because of
considerations of national preference or sovereignty." Task Force Letter, supra note 4.
[131] See 6 Whiteman, Digest of International Law (1968) at 204.
[132] Bassiouni and Nanda, A Treatise on International Criminal Law. Vol. 2 (1973) at 234.
[133] For a brief discussion of the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to this problem, see
Lashbrooke. supra note 126, at 238, 239.
[134] Speech by Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heymann. supra note 80, at 1504.
[135] SEC Seen Dropping Foreign Payoff Case Against Page Atrways at CIA's Request. The
Wall St. J.. April 8, 1980. According to the Journal, the Justice Department did not prosecute top
executives of Lockheed and ITT because of a similar fear of disclosure of national security secrets.
[136] FCPA Report, Supp. No. 8, supra note 80, at 4.
[137] Id. at 1503.
[138] Id.
[1391 See, Note, supra note 125.
[140] Id. at 570-80.
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[1411 Libya, Law No. 87 of 1975; Egypt, Law No. I IS of 1975. as amended bt, Ministerial
Decree No. 733 of 1975 and Ministerial Decision No. 947 of 1976; Abu Dhabi, Law No. II of
1973, Circular No. 3/78 of February 8, 1976; Saudi Arabia, Regulation of Service Agents. Royal
Decree M/2 of January 20, 1978; Kuwait. Law No. 37 of 1964, Law No. 36 of 1964.
[142] Jordan, Law No. 51 of 1978; Syria, Legislative Decree No. 151 of 1952, Decree No. 51 of
1979, Ministerial Circular of February 7, 1980; Kuwait, Law No. 37 of 1964, Law No. 36 of 1964;
Abu Dhabi, Decision No. 25 of 1979 (requiring that importing of goods for resale must be by
registered agent); Saudi Arabia, The Commercial Agencies Regulation, Royal Decree M/I I of
1962 as amended by Royal Decree M/8 of 1973.
[143] Only Algeria completely forbids the use of agents by foreign firms. Law No. 78-02 of
February II, 1978.
[144] See, e.g., Iraq. Law No. 8 for the year 1976, and its implementing Regulation No. I of
1976.
[145] Id. art. 2(c).
[1461 Algeria, supra note 143: Egypt, Law No. 118 of 1975, supra note 141. Jordan, Law No. 23
of 1979, art. 3; Syria, Legislative Decree No. 51, September 30, 1979: Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree
M/2 of January 20, 1978, supra note 141; Yemen Arab Republic. Law No. 17 of 1972 and Law
No. 6 of 1976.
[147] Egypt, Law No. 118 of 1975 and Ministerial Decision No. 947 of 1976, supra note 141;
Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree M/2 of January 20, 1980, supra note 141; Jordan. Law No. 23 of
1979, supra note 146.
[148] Royal Decree M/2 of January 20. 1978, supra note 141.
[149] Id. art. 4. It has recently been reported that the Saudi government is likely to prohibit the
use of agents in all Saudi government and agency contracts. Mid. East Exec. Repts. (November
1980) at 2.
[150] See, e.g., Algeria. supra note 143, chap. 2, art. 9.
[151] Saudi Arabia, Ministerial Decision by Minister of Commerce, No. 1502, Jan. 26. 1980.
[152] Jordan, Law No. 23 of 1979, art. 3(e), supra note 146.
[153] See Jordan: "Arms and Spare Parts" Terms Clarified for Agency Law, Mid. East Exec.
Repts. (March 1980) at 6.
[154] Saudi Arabia, Royal Decree M/2 of January 20. 1978, supra note 141.
[155] Id.
[156] Abu Dhabi, Law No.4 of 1977, art. 8.
[157] See Cartwright, Saudi Arabian Service and Conunercial Agents, Mid East Exec. Repts.
(October 1979) at 3.
[158] Id. at 16.
[159] Id.
[160] 1d. at 16-17.
[161] Id.
[162] Jordan, Foreign Exchange Control Law No. 95 of 1966, art. 9.
[163] Egypt, Law No. 97 of 1976.
[164] See, e.g., the facts of Habib v. Raytheon, Slip Op. No. 79-1147 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 1980).
[165] Jacoby et al., supra note 15, at 245.
[166] Kuwait, Law No. 37 of 1964.
[167] Saudi Arabia, Regulations against Bribery, arts. 15, 16, supra note 50.
[168] Algeria, Law No. 78-02 of February Ii, 1978, art. 12, supra note 143.
[169] The relevant pre-FCPA U.S. law is summarized and analyzed with respect to its
effectiveness in deterring questionable payments by American companies abroad in a letter from
Task Force Chairman Richardson to Senator Proxmire, supra note 4.
[1701 15 U.S.C. §78(m) (Supp. III 1979).
[171] 15 U.S.C. §78(m)(b)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol4/iss2/1
PJ. Suse / Questionable patnents in the Middle East
[1721 15 U.S.C. §78(m)(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 111 1979).
[173] S. Rep. No. I1. supra note 3.
[1741 See SEC v. Aminex, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)i196. 458 (D.D.C. 1978).
[1751 "[a]ny person who willfully violates any provisions of [the Exchange Act] ... shall upon
conviction be fined not more than $10.000 or imprisoned not more than five years. or both... ". 15
U.S.C. §78ff (Supp. III 1979).
[176] 15 U.S.C. §78u(d) (Supp. III 1979).
[1771 Such cooperation must be at the direction of the head of the department involved and
pursuant to Presidential authority to issue such directives. 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(3)(A).
[1781 Speech by SEC Chairman Williams on FCPA Accounting Provisions; See. Reg. & L
Rep. (BNA) 586, at 1-1.
[1791 Id.
[180] "Sen. Chafee will soon reintroduce bill to amend FCPA. Add Nationality Standard". Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 588. at D-1.
[1811 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77aa (1976); 15 U.S.C. §78(a): -78kk (1976).
[1821 See SEC v. United Brands Co.. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)ff95.420 (D.D.C. 1976).
[183] Reprinted in Senate Hearing. supra note 4. at 39-67.
[184] Id. at 54.
(1851 Id. at 55.
[186] Id. at 56.
[187] Depending upon the factual circumstances, an improper payment could violate sections I
or 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. §§1,2 (1970): section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
15 U.S.C. §45 (1970); or section 2(c) of the Clayton Act, the so-called brokerage provision of
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §13(c)(1970).
[1881 Task Force Letter, supra note 4.
[1891 See rd.
[1901 Id. at 51.
[1911 Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. §2399 (1970). It has been held that concealment of
improper payments in AID forms is a violation of 18 U.S.C. §1001 (1970) which makes it illegal to
conceal any matter within the jurisdiction of any U.S. department or agency. See U.S. v. Olin
Mathieson Chemical Corp.. 368 F. 2d 525 (2d cir. 1960).
[192] Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat 729 (1976).
[193] Hearings on S. 305, supra note 5.
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